

**Sciences Po
Master of Public Affairs 2009-2010**

Syllabus, Required Course, 2nd Semester (5 credits)

Governing by Delegation

Mark Thatcher and Hitomi Kubo

Instructors:

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Course Description:

The course will examine the radical reforms in the role of the state in governing markets that have taken place over recent years. The purpose is to analyze how and why the institutional structures of public policy making for markets have been altered, notably the delegation of powers to new national and supra-national bodies and the reduction in the direct role of the state as a supplier of traded services. The course combines theoretical analysis with examination of specific cases. Key topics will include: the move from industrial policy to regulation; privatization; liberalization of markets; delegation to non-majoritarian institutions, notably regulatory agencies, independent central banks and supra-national bodies; the role of elected politicians, firms and regulatory agencies in policy making; the expansion of EU regulation. The approach will be comparative across both countries and different markets. Although the reading list is mostly on Europe, students are encouraged to use material from other countries, including their own.

Course Objectives:

The course aims to develop students' analytical skills and ability to think critically about different explanations for changes in governance of markets and to challenge widely held conceptions such as a worldwide move to 'deregulation' or the 'rolling back of the state'. Particular emphasis is laid on the ability to argue, backing statements with data, and on appreciating different explanations of changes in the state's role in governing markets. Hence the course mixes theories with important cases in which analytical models and arguments are applied to empirical material. In addition, the seminars will involve students developing other skills, notably working together in small groups, and then reporting back on their findings, as well as discussions of the entire seminar group. Students will therefore be expected to be able to work with others, examine an issue and present a clear set of conclusions to the seminar. Finally, the case studies and project will involve research and hence searching for material and presenting it to the seminar.

Course Requirements:

In addition to attendance at seminars, students are expected to participate actively in seminar discussions, to read for seminars, to prepare cases, and to submit two essays for assessment. It is essential that students arrive at seminars prepared and having read the core reading. Otherwise it is difficult to follow this course.

Assessment:

1 30% of the final marks will be for a first 3,000 word (including footnotes but excluding bibliography) project essay. This must be typed or word-processed; it must be taken from the list of questions at the end of this syllabus. It must be submitted not later than 6 April 2010.

2 50% of the final marks will be for a second 3,500 word essay (including footnotes but excluding bibliography) that must be submitted by midday 15 May 2010. It must be on a topic relating to the syllabus for the seminar and the essay question must be approved by the class teacher.

3 20% the final marks will be for participation.

NB For the essays: if passages are taken from other people's writing, they must be explicitly referenced- ie author, title, and pages, including the precise page from which the passage is taken; otherwise unattributed passages count as plagiarism. The essays should answer the question directly and should draw on both theory and empirical material.

Session 1 The growth of regulation

Questions for discussion:

1 What is the Regulatory State?

2 How does it differ from the 'traditional' state and industrial policy?

3 'Transnational technological and economic changes made a move away from traditional institutions of public ownership, monopolies and government regulation of markets inevitable'. Discuss.

Key reading

Majone, G (1997), 'From the Positive to the regulatory State: Causes and Consequences of Changes in the Mode of Governance', *Journal of Public Policy*, 17(2), 139-68

Thatcher, M (2007/9), *Internationalisation and Economic Institutions*, chs 1 and 13

Hood, C *Explaining Economic Policy Reversals* ch 2

Thatcher, M, - 'Analysing Regulatory Reform in Europe', *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(6), 2002, pp859-872

Further reading

Levi-Faur, D, (2006), Varieties of Regulatory Capitalism: Sectors and Nations in the Making of a New Global Order, Governance, 19(3) or Levi-Faur, D. 2005) 'The Global Diffusion of Regulatory Capitalism'. *Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science*, 598: 12-33

Lodge, M (2008), 'Regulation, the Regulatory State and European Politics', West European Politics, 31(1 & 2): 280 - 301

Moran, M (2002) 'Understanding the Regulatory State' *British Journal of Political Science* 32: 391-413 or Moran, M (2003) *The Regulatory State* (Oxford University Press)

Thatcher, M, 'From Industrial Policy to a Regulatory State' in JES Hayward and A Menon (eds), *Governing Europe* (OUP, 2003)

McGowan, F and Wallace, H 'Towards a European Regulatory State,' *Journal of European Public Policy* Vol. 3, No. 4, 1996 pp560-76.

Session 2 Privatisation

Questions and themes

- 1 What is privatisation?
- 2 Why has it taken place?
- 3 Limits to privatisation and cross-national differences

Key reading

Feigenbaum, H, Henig, J and Hamnett, C (1999), *Shrinking the State*, esp chs 2-4; (Feigenbaum, H and Henig, J (1994), 'The Political Underpinnings of Privatisation. A Typology', *World Politics* 46(2), p.185-208- alternative to ch 2)

Murillo, MW (2002), 'Political Bias in Policy Convergence: Privatization choices in Latin America', *World Politics* 54: 462-93

Thatcher, M (2007), *Internationalisation and Economic Institutions*, pp165-9, and ch9

Baldwin, R and Caves, M (1999), *Understanding Regulation*, ch 14 OR Hood, C (1994), *Explaining Economic Policy Reversals*, Buckingham, Open University Press, chs 1 and 3

Clifton, Judith; Comín, Francisco; Díaz Fuentes, Daniel (2006), Privatizing public enterprises in the European Union 1960-2002: ideological, pragmatic, inevitable? *Journal of European Public Policy*, Volume 13, Number 5, August 2006, pp. 736-756

Wright, V (1994), 'Industrial privatisation in Western Europe: pressures, problems and paradoxes', in Wright, V (ed.), *Privatisation in Western Europe*, London, Pinter. Plus other chapters on specific countries, esp Dumez, H. and Jeunemaitre, A. 'Privatization in France 1983-1993' and Richardson, J. 'The politics and practice of privatisation in Britain'

Further reading

Meseguer, C (2004), 'What role for Learning? The diffusion of privatisation in OECD and Latin American Countries', *Journal of Public Policy* 24(3): 299-325

Kalyvanas, S (1994), 'Hegemony Breakdown: The Collapse of Nationalisation in Britain and France', *Politics and Society* 22(3), p.316-348.

Majone, G. (1994). "Paradoxes of Privatisation and Deregulation." 1(1) *Journal of European Public Policy* 53.

Schneider, V, Fink, S and Tenbucken, M (2005) 'Buying Out the State' *Comparative Political Studies* 38(6): 704-27

Köthenbürger, M (2006) (ed) *Privatization Experiences in the European Union* (covers different countries- draw on for examples)

Clifton, J, Comin, F and Fuentes, D (2003) *Privatisation in the European Union*

Session 3 Privatisation in developing countries

This class will examine the widespread process of privatization that took place in over 120 developing countries over the last three decades. During this class we will discuss:

- The origins of the movement towards privatization and the current state of privatization
- Some of the reasons developing country governments undertook privatization
 - Structural adjustment programs
 - Voluntary initiatives
- Examine the shortcomings of the model of privatization in developing economies: critical differences with regard to the objectives of privatization, institutional arrangements, the maturity of markets and property rights.
- Discuss impacts of privatization on poverty in developing countries.

Readings

Birdsall and Nellis, 'Privatization Reality Check: Distributional Effects in Developing Countries', Center for Global Development. Available at: <http://www.cgdev.org/doc/Privatization/ch%201.pdf>

Ghosh Banerjee, Sudeshna and Munger, Michael C, 'Move to Markets? An Empirical Analysis of Privatization in Developing Countries,' Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM) Working Paper No. 107.2002, December, 2002.

Kikeri, Sunita and Aishetu Fatima Kolo, 'Privatization: Trends and Recent Developments,' World Bank: World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 3765, November, 2005.

Meggison, WL (2005) *The financial economics of privatization* OUP- NB is very pro-privatisation

Meseguer, C (2004), 'What role for Learning? The diffusion of privatisation in OECD and Latin American Countries', *Journal of Public Policy* 24(3): 299-325

Parker, David and Kirkpatrick, Colin (2005)'Privatisation in Developing Countries: A Review of the Evidence and the Policy Lessons', *Journal of Development Studies*, 41:4, 513-541.

Session 4 Delegation to non-majoritarian institutions

1 Why do elected politicians create non-majoritarian institutions?

2 Does central bank independence show the power of ideas in delegation to non-majoritarian institutions?

3 What are the effects of delegation to non-majoritarian institutions?

4 Has delegation led to 'deregulation' and a reduction in the role of the state?

5 How can non-majoritarian institutions be held accountable?

Key reading

Thatcher, M and Stone Sweet, A (2002), 'Theory and Practice of Delegation to Non-Majoritarian Institutions', *West European Politics* vol 25(1) (2002) pp1-22.

McNamara, K (2002), 'The Diffusion of Central bank Independence as an Organization Form', *West European Politics* January 2002 or for longer treatment
McNamara, K (1998), *The Currency of Ideas: Monetary Policy in the EU* (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

Marcussen, M (2005), 'Central banks on the move', *Journal of European Public Policy* 12(5): 903-23

Goodman, J (1991), 'The Politics of Central Bank Independence' *Comparative Politics* 23(3): 329-49; or for fuller treatment- Goodman, J (1992), *Monetary*

Sovereignty: The Politics of Central Banking in Western Europe (Ithaca: Cornell University Press)

Coen, D and Thatcher, M (2005) 'The new governance of markets and non-majoritarian regulators', *Governance*, 18(3)

Vogel, S, *Freer Markets, More Rules* (1996), Chs 1, 2 and 11

Moran, M. (2002) 'Understanding the Regulating State', *British Journal of Political Science* 32: 391-413.

Kerwer, D (2005) 'Holding Global Regulators Accountable: The Case of Credit Rating Agencies', *Governance*, 18(3)

Further reading

Journal of Common Market Studies 44(4) 2006- special issue reassessing EMU
Epstein, D and O'Halloran, S. (1999). *Delegating Powers. A Transaction Cost Politics Approach to Policy Making under Separate Powers*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.)

Bernhard, W (1998) 'A Political Explanation of Variations in Central Bank Independence', *American Political Science Review* 92(2): 311-28

King, M (2005), 'Epistemic Communities and the Diffusion of Ideas: central bank reform in the UK', *West European Politics* 28(1): 94-123

Quaglia, L (2005), 'An Integrative Approach to the Politics of Central Bank Independence: lessons from Britain, Germany and Italy', *West European Politics* 28(3): 549-68

Elgie, R. (1998) 'Democratic accountability and central bank independence: historical, contemporary, national and European perspectives', *West European Politics*, 21:3, 53-76

Blinder, A (1998), *Central Banking in Theory and Practice* (Cambridge: MIT Press)

Maxfield, S (1997), *The Political Economy of Central Banking in Developing Countries* (ch 1, but other chs for developing countries)

Schmidt, V. (2002), *The Futures of European Capitalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press- read key parts that interest you, especially on national responses to international and European pressures

Peltzman, S (1989), 'The Economic Theory of Regulation After A Decade of Deregulation' *Brookings Papers on Economic Activity* (Microeconomics): 1-41.

Session 5 Delegation (cont) and Essay writing

We will apply the discussion to a case study of delegation. In addition, we will discuss essay writing to prepare for the first essay.

Session 6 Regulatory reform in developing countries

This class will examine the process of regulatory reform—deregulation and the delegation to non-majoritarian institutions in developing countries, with a focus on infrastructure regulation. In particular, the class will examine the status of regulatory reform in developing countries, the role of IFIs and donor agencies in the promotion of delegation, the challenges of regulation and some of the primary reasons for regulatory “failure” including:

- Regulatory capture and corruption
- Judicial reform, the rule of law and adjudication
- Cultural differences with regard to Western-model
- Resources

Readings

Guasch , J. Luis and Robert W. Hahn, ‘The Costs and Benefits of Regulation: Some Implications for Developing Countries,’ Background paper for World Bank World Development Report, March, 1997.

Kirkpatrick, Colin, Parker, David, and Zhang, Yin-Fang ‘Foreign Direct Investment in Infrastructure in Developing Countries: Does Regulation Make a Difference?’ Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, Paper No. 85, June, 2004.

Levy, B and Spiller, P (1995). Regulations, Institutions and Commitment: Comparative Studies in Telecommunications, Cambridge, Cambridge University Press

Minogue, M and Carino, L (2006). Introduction : regulatory governance in developing countries, Edward Elgar Publishing Read introduction.

Noll, Roger G, ‘Telecommunications Reform in Developing Countries,’ AEI-Brookings Joint Center for Regulatory Studies, Working Paper 99-10, July, 1999.

Ogus, Anthony, ‘Towards Appropriate Institutional Arrangements for Regulation in Less Developed Countries,’ Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, Paper No. 119, June, 2005.

World Bank (2006) Infrastructure at the crossroads, September 2006.

<http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTINFNETWORK/Resources/InfrastructureattheCrossroads.pdf>

Look over the Telecommunications Regulation Database for Developing Countries.

Sessions 7 and 8 Delegation to non-majoritarian bodies: Independent regulatory agencies

Session 7 Questions

- 1 Why have independent regulatory agencies spread in Europe?
- 2 How have independent regulatory agencies altered the nature of regulation in Europe?
- 3 What legitimacy problems arise with IRAs and how can they be tackled?

Key reading

Thatcher, M (2002), -'Delegation to Independent Regulatory Agencies: Pressures, Functions and Contextual Mediation', *West European Politics* vol 25(1) pp.125-47

Levy, Brian, and Pablo T Spiller. (1996). *Regulation, Institutions and Commitment*. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press). OR Levy, Brian and Pablo T Spiller, "The Institutional Foundations of Regulatory Commitment: A Comparative Analysis of Telecommunications Regulation" (1994) 10 *Journal of Law, Economics and Organisation* 201-246.

Thatcher, M (2005), 'The Third Force? Independent Regulatory Agencies and Elected Politicians in Europe', *Governance* 18(3): 347-373

Gilardi, F (2002) Policy Credibility and Delegation to IRAs *Journal of European Public Policy* 9(6) pp873-93

Elgie, R. (2006). 'Why do governments delegate authority to quasi-autonomous agencies? The case of Independent Administrative Authorities in France'. *Governance*, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp207-227

Maggetti, Martino(2009), 'The role of independent regulatory agencies in policy-making: a comparative analysis', *Journal of European Public Policy*,16:3,450 — 470

Further reading

Geradin, D., Munoz, R. and Petit, N. (eds.) (2005), *Regulatory authorities in the EC: a new paradigm for European governance*, Aldershot: Edward Elgar.

Coen, D (2005), Business-Regulatory Relations: Learning to play regulatory games in European utility markets. *Governance* 18(3)

Dreyfus, F.(2004). "Les Autorités Administratives Indépendantes: De l'Intérêt Général à Celui des Grands Corps ." *In Etudes en l'Honneur de Jean Calude Hélin*. Paris: Litec.

Coen, D and Héritier A (Eds)., (2005). *Redefining Regulatory Regimes: Utilities in Europe*. Cheltenham, Edward Elgar.

Prosser, T *Law and the Regulators* (1997), esp. Ch 2

Padgett, S. (2003), 'Between synthesis and emulation: EU policy transfer in the power sector', *Journal of European Public Policy* 10,2: 227-245.

G. Majone (1999) 'The Regulatory State and its Legitimacy Problems', *West European Politics* 22(1): 1-24.

Session 8- group exercise

We will apply the above to a case of IRAs to see :

- arguments for creating IRAs
- decisions about their institutional form
- their relationships with key actors and their effects

Session 9 EU regulation

Questions

1 Why has EU regulation of markets grown?

2 How has the EU affected governance of markets by national governments?

Key reading

Thatcher, M, (2005) 'European Regulation' in JJ Richardson (ed), *European Union: Power and Policy Making* (Routledge, 3rd ed)

G. Majone (ed.) (1996), *Regulating Europe*, London: Routledge (skim for main arguments about EU)

Schmidt, S (1996), 'Sterile debates and dubious generalisations: European integration theory tested by telecommunications and electricity', *Journal of Public Policy*, 16, pp233-71

Eising, R. (2002), 'Policy Learning in Embedded Negotiations: Explaining EU Electricity Liberalization', *International Organization* 56,1: 85-120.

Bulmer, S and Padgett, S (2005) 'Policy Transfer in the European Union: An Institutionalist Perspective', *British Journal of Political Science*, 35(1), January 2005, pp 103-126 OR Bulmer, S., Dolowitz, D., Humphreys, P. and Padgett, S. (2007). *Policy Transfer in the European Union. Regulating the Utilities*. London: Routledge

Thatcher, M (2007), *Internationalisation and Economic Institutions*, chs 1 and 13, and then those case studies that interest you

Schmidt, VA (2002) 'Europeanization and the Mechanics of Economic Policy Adjustment', *Journal of European Public Policy*, 9/6: 894–912 or for longer treatment *The Futures of European Capitalism*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.

Further reading

Thatcher, M (2001)-'The Commission and national governments as partners: EC regulatory expansion in telecommunications 1979-2000', *Journal of European Public Policy* 8:4: 558-84.

Radaelli, C and Schmidt, V. A. (eds.) (2004). 'Policy Change and Discourse in Europe', Special Issue, *West European Politics*, 27/2.

Green Cowles, M., Caporaso J., Risse, T., and Héritier, R. (eds.) (2001). *Transforming Europe*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, especially Introduction.

Schmidt, VA (2006). *Democracy in Europe: The EU and National Politics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press (not just markets but also politics).

Pollack, M (2003), *The Engines of European Integration* (OUP), ch 6

Wilks, S (2005) 'Agency Escape: Decentralisation or Dominance of the European Commission in the Modernisation of Competition Policy?', *Governance* 18(3)

Egan, M. (2001). *Constructing a European Market*, (Oxford: Oxford University Press)

Sauter, W (1997), *Competition Law and Industrial Policy in the EU*, ch5

Coen, D. (1998) 'The European Business Interest and the Nation State: Large-firm lobbying in the European Union and Member States', *Journal of Public Policy* 18,1: 75--100.

Dehousse, R. (1992) 'Integration v. Regulation? On the Dynamics of Regulation in the European Community', *Journal of Common Market Studies* XXX,4: 383--402.

Héritier, A. (1996) 'The accommodation of diversity in European policy making and its outcomes: regulatory policy as a patchwork', *Journal of European Public Policy* 3,2: 149--67.

Tallberg, J. (2002) 'Delegation to Supranational Institutions: Why, How, and with What Consequences?', *West European Politics* 25(1): 23-46.

Session 10 WTO, the liberalization of trade, and the impacts on poverty and health in developing countries

This class will examine the linkages between processes, institutions and impacts of both privatisation and regulatory reform in developing countries. We will examine briefly the role of the WTO in regulating international trade, and specifically the General Agreement on Trades in Services (GATS), which, among other provisions, promotes privatisation in the services industry.

Readings

Chanda, R. 'GATS and the implications for developing countries: Key issues and concerns.' DESA Discussion Paper No. 25, November, 2002.

Guha-Khasnobis, Basudeb (ed.) 'WIDER Special Issue: Developing Countries in the WTO Regime: Selected Issues,' Journal of Economic Integration, Vol. 19, Issue 2, June, 2004.

Henderson, Jeffrey, 'Global Production Networks, Competition, Regulation and Poverty Reduction: Policy Implications,' Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, Paper No. 115, June, 2005.

Kirkpatrick, Colin and Parker, David, 'Regulation and the privatisation of water services in developing countries: Assessing the impact of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS),' Centre on Regulation and Competition Working Paper Series, Paper No. 67, June, 2004.

VanDuzer, Anthony J. (2005). "Navigating between the Poles: Unpacking the Debate on the Implications for Development of GATS Obligations Relating to Health and Education Services," in *Reforming the World Trading System: Legitimacy, Efficiency and Democratic Governance*, Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann (ed.), Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Whalley, John, 'Assessing the Benefits to Developing Countries of Liberalisation in Services Trade,' World Economy, Vol. 27, Issue 8, p. 1223-1253, August, 2004.

Session 11 Cross-national comparison of governance of markets: the cases of France and Britain

1 Why has the role of the state in governing markets been altered further in Britain than France?

2 The position and role of national champions

3 What space is left for national industrial policies in Europe?

Key reading

Hall, P.A. and Soskice, D. (2001) *Varieties of Capitalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press. Esp Intro by Hall and Soskice, and ch by Hancke

Hayward, JES (ed.) (1995), *Industrial Enterprise and European Integration*, Oxford, OUP- esp chs by Cohen and Grant, plus pick chapters on sectors or other countries that interest you

Thatcher, M (2007), 'Regulatory agencies, the state and markets: a Franco-British comparison', *Journal of European Public Policy* 14(7) (2007): 1028-1047

Pierre B and Varone, F (2007), Europeanization of the French electricity policy: four paradoxes, *Journal of European Public Policy* 14(7) (2007): 1048 – 1060

Modern & Contemporary France 1997, no. 5(2), special issue on la fin du *dirigisme*

Schmidt, V. (2002), *The Futures of European Capitalism*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Further reading

There is a great deal of material on the topic- here is a selection

Muller, P (1989), *Airbus, l'Ambition européenne: Logique d'état, logique de marché* (Paris: l'Harmattan).

Cohen, E., *Le colbertisme "high tech"* (Paris: Hachette, 1992).

or

Cohen, E. (1996), *La Tentation Hexagonale* (Paris: Fayard).

Thatcher, M, 'From Industrial Policy to a Regulatory State' in JES Hayward and A Menon (eds), *Governing Europe* (OUP, 2003)

Journal of European Public Policy Volume 14(7): 1048 – 1060 special issue on France, especially introduction by E Grossman

Rouban, L. (1997), 'La crise du service public en France: l'Europe comme catalyseur', *Culture et Conflits* 28: 99-124.

Cawson, A, Holmes, P, Webber, D, Morgan and Stevens, A, (1990), Hostile Brothers, Oxford, Clarendon Press- chs 5 and 6.

Suleiman, E. and Courty, G. (1997), *L'Âge d'or de l'État* (Paris: Éditions du Seuil).

Smith, R. (1995), *The Left's Dirty Job. The Politics of Industrial Restructuring in France and Spain* (Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press).

Schmidt, V.A. (1996), *From State to Market? The Transformation of French Business and Government* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press).

Session 12 Telecommunications regulation in Europe

Questions:

1. How can the contrasting patterns of ownership and regulation operation of telecommunications in France, Britain and other European countries be explained?

2 Why were regulatory institutions for telecommunications that had lasted for decades reformed so radically from the 1980s onwards?

Key reading

Thatcher, M (2004)-‘Varieties of capitalism in an internationalized world: Domestic institutional change in European telecommunications’, *Comparative Political Studies*, 37(7) (2004): 1-30 OR Thatcher, M (2007/2009), *Internationalisation and Economic Institutions* chs 8 and 9

Natalicchi, G. (2001). *Wiring Europe. Reshaping the European telecommunications Regime*. Lanham: Rowan & Littlefield OR Eliassen, K and Svojaag, M (eds), (1999) *Liberalising European Telecommunications* (London: Routledge)- wide coverage of national experiences but now dated

Humphreys, P and Padgett, S (2006) ‘Globalization, the European Union, and Domestic Governance in Telecoms and Electricity’ *Governance*, 19(3): 383-406

Humphreys, P and Simpson, S (2008) ‘Globalization, the ‘Competition’ State and the Rise of the ‘Regulatory’ State in European Telecommunications’, *Journal of Common Market Studies* 46(4): 849–874

Britain and France

Thatcher, M. (1999). *The Politics of Telecommunications*. Oxford: Oxford University Press

Stehmann, O. (1995). *Network competition for European telecommunications*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Zahariadis, N. (1992). To Sell or Not to Sell? Telecommunications Policy in Britain and France. *Journal of Public Policy*, 12(4), 355-76.

Hulsink, W. (1999). *Privatisation and liberalisation in European Telecommunications. Comparing Britain, the Netherlands and France*. London: Routledge.

Schneider, V., Dang-Nguyen, G. and Werle, R. (1994). Corporate Actor Networks in European Policy-Making: Harmonizing Telecommunications Policy. *Journal of Common Market Studies* 32(4), 473-98.

France

Vialle, P. (1998). *Stratégies des opérateurs de télécoms*. Paris: Hermes.

Chevallier, J. (1996). La nouvelle réforme des télécommunications: ruptures et continuités. *Revue Française de Droit Administratif*, 12(5), 909-951.

Cohen, E. (1992). *Le colbertisme "high tech"*. Paris: Hachette.

Sessions 13-14 Student projects

Students should bring an outline of their project essay covering the following points:

- title
- research question
- why this is interesting/important
- case chosen
- analytical framework used to answer the question
- empirical evidence and sources to be used- and especially setting out a limited secondary literature and a manageable primary source of material
- outline of structure of essay.

You should consider carefully:

- is your research question sufficiently focused?
- how easily accessible is your source material?
- how much time will it take to gather the material?
- how much time will it take to read the material once gathered?
- what will your essay add to existing work (in order to avoid being just a summary of existing secondary literature, without requiring a disproportionate use of time).

Essay titles for 1st essay

- 1 'The spread of the regulatory state is a myth'. Discuss.
- 2 'Contrary to appearances, privatization is not one but several different phenomena'. Discuss.
- 3 Why have elected politicians created independent central banks?
- 4 To what extent has delegation to independent regulatory agencies been due to new ideas?
- 6 Why has EITHER the EU OR the WTO become such a powerful regulator?
- 7 Can European nations still pursue national industrial policies?