

Sciences Po
Master of Public Affairs 2009-2010

Syllabus, Required Course, 2nd Semester (5 credits)

Comparative Public Management

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Instructor:

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Course Description:

This course provides a comparative introduction to the study of public management and public finance. Its focus is on an actor-centered approach and understanding concrete management challenges and developing practical skills rather than on a review of different theoretical approaches to public management. The first part of the course focuses on problems encountered in policy implementation. The second section of the course examines basic tasks of governmental organization (e.g., budgeting, recruitment and retention of personnel, accountability mechanisms, and use of policy evaluation and performance measurement techniques). The final section of the course looks at public sector reform strategies.

In each section of the course, we focus on the following key questions:

- What are the key management tasks and challenges that governments confront? What options do governments have in addressing each of these tasks and challenges, and what constraints do they face? What resources are needed for government to be “successful” with each of these options?
- What is distinctive about the resources, constraints, available public management options, and actual public management choices and outputs in less developed countries that influences their effectiveness in delivery of public services?

Throughout the course, there will be a strong emphasis on analyzing case materials. Primary emphasis will be given to materials from developing countries, with a special focus on China, India and Mexico.

Course Objectives:

The most important objective of the course is to train students to think not just about identifying what may be the most efficient solution to policy problems in the abstract, but what obstacles are likely to arise in making proposed solutions work in practice, and in developing organizational capacity to overcome those obstacles. Group projects will develop students' ability to identify mission-critical management and implementation problems faced by organizations, and develop solutions to those problems. Students will also gain experience in working in teams, dividing labor among team members, and presenting key ideas clearly and succinctly.

Course Requirements:

Student assessments will be based on the following criteria:

- Students will have take-home memo-writing assignments that will be handed out after both the first and second clusters of classes (i.e., after sessions 4 and 8). Your memo should be approximately 1,200 words, or about 4 typed, double-spaced pages (not including endnotes) for each assignment. Students will have some choice of topics designated by the instructor. The first memo assignment will be due on Monday, March 9th at 17h. The second memo assignment will be due on Monday, April 9th at 17h. **Second year students only** will also have a third memo assignment due on May 29th at 17h.
- The other written assignment will involve management consulting jobs for a hypothetical client on real public management problems. Examples of past student project topics include:
 - implementing a traffic congestion charge for New Delhi,
 - bringing Sweden into the Euro,
 - privatizing the Nigerian electric power industry,
 - restructuring the Mexican state oil company (PEMEX),
 - devising an improved management structure for the 2010 World Cup,
 - improving treatment of ex-child soldiers in Colombia,
 - developing a new mechanism for compensating and resettling persons displaced by the Narmada dam project in India,
 - development of new public pension systems for India and China,
 - developing more effective implementation strategies for HIV reduction services in Andhra Pradesh.

Students will work on a project in multi-person teams. Each team will produce a collaborative Powerpoint presentation and a brief jointly-authored introductory memorandum. Each member of the team will also produce an individually-authored memorandum on a specific component of the team's proposal, with a focus on management, public finance and implementation issues. The collaborative memos should be about 2,000 words in total length, and each individual memo should be around 1,200 words in length.

- Because this course is primarily a discussion class, it is imperative that all students prepare for and participate in class discussions. Particularly important are the case discussions planned for almost every class session. I will begin these discussions by calling on one or more students to present the facts of the case and, where appropriate, to discuss possible options for policymakers and constraints on choosing specific options. Students are encouraged to work together in study groups to prepare cases before class, but this is not required. Quality of contributions to class discussions is more important than quantity, but quantity is also important.

Assessment:

Grades will be decided on the following basis:

First policy memo.....	20%
Second policy memo.....	20%
Group Memo and Presentation—Individual component...	25%
Group Memo and Presentation—Group component.....	15%
Class participation.....	20%

Books and other materials required:

Course readings average about 120 pages per week. The following book is strongly recommended for purchase:

James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, New York: Basic Books, 1991

Most additional required readings will be available in a course reading packet.

Course schedule:

The class will meet 13 times over the course of the semester, for 2 hours each session. Nine of these class sessions we will meet together. In the final class session, we will meet in smaller groups for group project presentations. You are only required to attend the session to which your group has been assigned, but you are of course welcome to attend the others as well.

The class schedule meets on the following days from 14h45 to 16h45:

- March 15, 17
- March 22, 24
- March 29, 31
- April 12, 14
- April 19, 21
- May 10, 12
- May 17, 19

PART I: CHALLENGES OF POLICY IMPLEMENTATION

Session 1— Monday, March 15

Theme: Organizations and their Political Environments

Required Readings

- 70 James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, pp. 14-28, 113-136, 196-217, 295-312
- 20 Merilee Grindle, "Good Enough Governance Revisited," *Development Policy Review*, vol. 25, no. 5 (2007), pp. 533-574.

"Organizational Diagnosis for Public Management" handout

CASE: WATER AND SEWERAGE IN HYDERABAD, INDIA

- 25 Kennedy School Case CR14-06-1828.0, "The Hyderabad Water Supply and Sewerage Board"
115 pages

Optional Readings

World Bank, *Making Services Work for Poor People*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003, pp. 159-174 [This chapter on drinking water and sanitation is very useful background for the HMWSSB case]

Study Questions

1. What does Wilson mean by a "critical task" (p. 25) and "critical environmental problem"? Why does Wilson think that this is so important? Do most public organizations have a single "critical task and critical environmental problem"? Do you find this to be a helpful concept, or can it be misleading? Why does Wilson focus on tasks rather than goals? (p. 26) Does this concept travel well--that is, is it useful in explaining bureaucratic behavior outside the United States? Does the HMWSSB have a "critical task" and a "critical environmental problem, for example"?
2. What does Wilson mean by "key constraints" (p. 115) and "contextual goals" (p. 129) that government agencies must address? Are these concepts useful in explaining the behavior of the HMWSSB?
3. How applicable are the arguments that Wilson makes about the reasons for appointment of executive agency heads to the experience of your own country? What about his arguments about the kinds of strategies that executives pursue? Are agency heads in your home country generally careerist or political, or some combination of the two? How does this affect their behavior?
4. What are the major dysfunctions to which bureaucracies may fall victim? Are these inevitable or avoidable? Are the risks of these dysfunctions similar

across societies, or are some environments more likely to give rise to certain dysfunctions than others? Are some particular bureaucracies more likely to be poorly run than others?

5. Why do Swedish and U.S. workplace safety inspectors behave differently, according to Wilson (pp. 295-297)? Do you agree with his explanations? How would workplace inspectors behave in your country? Why would they behave in this way? How useful is "national culture" as an explanation of bureaucratic behavior?
6. How and why is public management likely to be different in advanced industrial and in less developed countries? How and why is it likely to be similar in the two contexts?
7. What constitutes "good governance"? What does Grindle mean by "good enough governance"? What is her criticism of the "essentialist" nature of the "good governance agenda"? [p. 554]
8. What conditions are needed for "good governance" to occur? For "good enough governance"? Does the "Good enough governance" concept provide concrete advice about reform priorities in specific less developed countries? What priorities would *you* suggest?
9. Are there some governance reforms that are more critical than others to promote better governance in less developed countries? Which ones? Why these reforms?
10. What are the major tasks of the HMWSSB? [See the relevant sections and questions on the "Organizational Diagnosis for Public Management" handout] Are there some that fit Wilson's definition of a "critical task"?
11. What are the major opportunities and threats posed by HMWSSB's external environment? [See the relevant sections and questions on the "Organizational Diagnosis for Public Management" handout] Do its political masters provide it with a clear and achievable mandate? With the financial resources it needs to accomplish its mission? Are relationships with users friendly or contentious? What about with its suppliers?
12. Develop a set of performance indicators for the HMSSB, including adequacy, regularity and quality of water supply; percentage of sewage treated; efficiency of provision; responsiveness to consumer complaints, etc. [See the relevant sections and questions on the "Organizational Diagnosis for Public Management" handout] What does it do well? What does it do poorly? If there are differences across indicators, what explains the differences? Consider in particular the efforts of the HMWSSB to improve the quality of the services that it provides to and improve responsiveness to the poorest citizens of Hyderabad/Secunderabad. What were its successes and failures in this regard?
13. What are the major strengths and weaknesses of the HMWSSB as an organization? . [See the relevant questions on the "Organizational Diagnosis for Public Management" handout] Consider in particular its financial position (capacity to finance its operating needs and capital needs from user charges), its relations with its employees, and the quality of its leadership.
14. Analyze the cost structure and user charges of the HMWSSB, using the data provided at the end of the Kennedy School case. Note in particular the gap between income and expenditure in Table 1 (page 21) of the case. What are

the implications of these figures for the ability of the HMWSSB to finance service improvements?

15. Why is so much of the Board's water unaccounted for (see for example the Kennedy School case, p. 5)? What can be done about it?
16. What should the primary goals of the HMWSSB be? How should it prioritize among multiple goals? What strategies should HMWSSB pursue to achieve those goals? Among the strategies you may wish to consider are full or partial (through contracting out) privatization, increases in user charges, improving collection efforts from existing users, cracking down on illegal drawing of supply, cutting down on services that do not produce revenue (e.g., public taps and water tankers), adjustments to labor force size, adjustments to the Board's governance structure, and borrowing from private, governmental, and international sources. What are the advantages and disadvantages of each strategy? What are constraints on each strategy (e.g., see page 4 of the Kennedy School case on constraints on tariff structures). Consider how each of the strategies you suggest for HMWSSB relates to the "good enough governance" concerns of Grindle.
17. Should privatization of the Hyderabad Metropolitan Water Supply and Sewerage Board (HMSSB) be tried? If so, are any of the three options outlined on page 3 of the Kennedy School case preferable, or should other options be considered? Why was the World Bank concerned about the implications of HMWSSB privatization for extension of services to the poor (Kennedy School case, p. 2)? Do you agree with these concerns? What are the constraints on privatization for HMWSSB that are suggested by the case? Is it likely to be attractive for international water companies?

Session 2— Wednesday, March 17, 18h

Theme: Implementation, Leadership, Culture and Organizational Collaboration

- 40 Wilson, *Bureaucracy*, pp. 90-110, 179-195, 268-274.
- 10 World Bank, *Making Services Work for Poor People*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003, pp. 64-75 (remainder of the chapter is optional)

CASE MATERIAL:

Watch the following video:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=424YskAfew>

and look at the following background information on the video:

<http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=100346538>

- 45 David K. Leonard, *African Successes: Four Public Managers of Kenyan Rural Development*, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 125-144, 168-177, 248-274
- 20 "Confronting HIV/AIDS in Pingxiang, China, Parts A and B," Kennedy School Cases CR16-06-1785.0 and CR 16-06-1786.0

Study Questions

1. What does Wilson mean by organizational culture (p. 91)? Do all organizations have a “culture”? What sorts of conditions tend to support an existing organizational culture? What sorts of conditions tend to undermine it? What are the costs of an organizational culture? Can they be mitigated? How?
2. Can an organization perform effectively if it lacks a shared “mission”? [Wilson, p. 95] Why does Wilson think that mission is important? Did Karanja at KTDA attempt to shape the sense of mission for the organizations? *How* did he do so? *What* mission did he want to inculcate and *why*?
3. What does Wilson mean by a “mission-jurisdiction match”? (p. 187) Can you think of other situations where a mismatch between mission and jurisdiction has been a problem? Did Karanja and Dr. Li encounter this problem?
4. Why is coordinating the activities of agencies with overlapping jurisdictions so difficult, according to Wilson? Are there strategies that public sector managers can use to minimize conflicts? Under what conditions are these strategies most likely to be successful? What sorts of strategies did Karanja and Dr. Li use? Were they successful?
5. Is there a difference between effective management and leadership in public organizations? Do all public managers need to be leaders? Do all agency leaders need to be good managers? Is it always good to have a “leader” as an agency head? Is there a particular “leadership style” associated with effective agency leadership, or are several styles possible? Are differing leadership styles required for success in different cultures?
6. What are the major sources of implementation problems in the World Bank Report?
7. What do the authors of the World Bank Report mean by the “long route” and the “short route in public accountability”? What are the problems with the long route?
8. What are the options for increasing “short route” accountability? Are there problems with these solutions—e.g., giving vouchers to poor people? What are the problems that may arise with competition and monitoring? Are there ways to make these work better?
9. What is the “eight sizes fit all” model? What do you think of the “eight sizes fit all” model as a guide for reform strategy in service delivery?
10. Did Karanja attempt to shape the sense of mission for the KTDA? *How* did he do so? *What* mission did he want to inculcate and *why*?
11. What does an organizational diagnosis of the Kenya Tea Development Authority (goals, tasks, internal strengths and weaknesses of the organization, external opportunities and threats, organizational tasks, performance indicators-see the chart from Week 1) suggest about the strengths and weaknesses of the agency? How useful is an organizational diagnosis as a framework for analyzing KTDA? What does it do well and what does it do poorly?
12. What was the situation of the Kenya Tea Development Authority when Karanja took over its leadership? Was KTDA successful under his

- leadership? By what criteria? What were the major constraints he faced in exercising leadership.
13. What were the major elements of Karanja's leadership style? What might he have done differently if he had read Wilson's book? Would this have led to more successful outcomes?
 14. What are the major agencies whose efforts must be coordinated in the fight against HIV/AIDS in Pingxiang? How did these agencies' perceptions of their own organizational "missions" (Wilson) affect their willingness to cooperate with Li and Wang? More generally, what were the major barriers to achieving effective cooperation in Pingxiang? What could have gone wrong that did not? Why did it not go wrong? Are the barriers encountered by Li and Wang unique to China, or are they fairly typical of other developing countries? Of wealthy countries as well?
 15. What sorts of leadership and coordination skills are needed for Dr. Li to exercise effective leadership in combating HIV in Pingxiang? Compare to Karanja and the KTDA in Kenya. More generally, how do political environments affect the skills that agency leaders need to perform their jobs effectively?
 16. What techniques proved to be effective in convincing leaders of other agencies of the importance of combating HIV? Which techniques were not effective? What was it that made some techniques effective and others less so?
 17. Compare the coordination problems that Li and Wang faced in mounting an anti-HIV campaign in Pingxiang to those that would be confronted in your own country. Are they similar or different? What would you have to do differently if you were placed in Dr. Li's role in a district in your country?

Session 3— Monday, March 22

Theme: "Frontline Workers" and Organization of Service Delivery

- 80 James Q. Wilson, *Bureaucracy: What Government Agencies Do and Why They Do It*, pp. 31-89,154-175.
- 10 Robert D. Behn, "Creating an Innovative Organization: Ten Hints for Involving Frontline Workers," *State and Local Government Review*,_Vol. 27, No. 3, Fall 1995

CASE MATERIAL:

- 10 "The Overcrowded Clinic," Electronic Hallway Teaching Case
- 25 Nazmul Chaudhury, Jeffrey Hammer, Michael Kremer, Karthik Muralidharan, and F. Halsey Rogers, "Missing in Action: Teacher and Health Worker Absence in Developing Countries," *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Winter2006, Vol. 20 Issue 1, p91-116
- 10 Electronic Hallway Case, "Run Before You Get Shot Down (Part A)
135 pages

Study Questions

1. What are “operators” (Wilson) or “street level bureaucrats” (Lipsky)? What are some examples of these kinds of workers? What government employees are not street level bureaucrats? What is different about them from other government employees? Does he provide any useful ideas on how to improve the performance of program operators to meet agency objectives?
2. What does Wilson mean by “situational imperatives”? Are these equally important for all government operators? Are situational imperatives for all members of a profession (e.g., teachers, foresters) and those who perform similar tasks (e.g., police officers on a street beat, clerks processing drivers’ licenses) across national contexts, or even at different localities within a particular national context? Why or why not? How are situational imperatives for operators in developing countries likely to be different than those in advanced industrial countries? What are the situational imperatives faced by operators in the three cases—the Barrio Lopez clinic, teachers in developing countries, and the Nepal development case—discussed in this week’s readings?
3. Wilson argues that peer expectations are important determinants of the behavior of “operators.” (p. 45ff) Is this equally true for all operators? Why or why not?
4. Why do agencies differ in the degree to which they are “captured” by the interests that they deal with, according to Wilson? Is interest group capture more likely in some political systems than in others? In LDCs or wealthy countries? Under what conditions is interest group capture most and least likely?
5. What are the objectives of the Barrio Lopez clinic described in the “Overcrowded Clinic” case? How does it operate? What are its major problems? What would a useful set of performance indicators be and how do you think that the clinic would do on each of those indicators?
6. Who are the operators or “front line workers at the Barrio Lopez clinic? How are its operations constrained by internal and external constraints: the tasks its staff are assigned, beliefs and incentives of street level bureaucrats (including monitoring systems), resource constraints, client attitudes and behavior, and office practices?
7. What changes could be made to make the clinic operate more efficiently?
8. Is the diagnosis of service delivery problems in health care service delivery in the World Bank report similar to the problems that are present in the Barrio Lopez case? Are the mechanisms recommended by the World Bank report likely to be very helpful in helping them meet their objectives? Why or why not?
[Questions will be added on teacher absence, the Behn reading, and the Nepal case]

Session 4— Wednesday, March 24

Theme: Obtaining Compliance from Program Targets

10 Michael Lipsky, *Street Level Bureaucrats*, pp. 54-65

- 25 R. Kent Weaver, "If You Build It, Will They Come?: Overcoming Unforeseen Obstacles in Program implementation"

CASE MATERIAL: SWEDISH PENSION ACCOUNTS AND DISEASE PREVENTION, COMPULSORY VILLAGIZATION AND SCHOOL ATTENDANCE

The theme of all of the case readings for Session 4 is understanding why the targets of policy may behave in unexpected ways--for example failing to stay in the new villages established in Tanzania, not choosing a pension account provider in Sweden, not attending school in Kolkata or Ethiopia, and not cooperating with health care campaigns. We will see that the reasons are quite complex, and that policymakers' failure to understand these reasons can lead to policy that fail to achieve their objectives--or worse.

- 5 R. Kent Weaver, Social Security Smorgåsbord: Lessons from Sweden's Individual Pension Accounts, Brookings Institution Policy Brief 140
- 30 Disease Prevention article packet 2010
- 10 Elisha Renne, "Perspectives on polio and immunization in Northern Nigeria," *Social Science and Medicine*, Volume 63, Issue 7 (October 2006) pages 1857-1869
- 20 James Scott, "Compulsory Villagization in Tanzania: Aesthetics and Miniaturization, in *Seeing Like A State*, pages 223-247. Skip the latter part of the chapter, where he draws parallels to Ethiopia.
- 8 "Enrolling and Retaining Slum Children in Formal Schools: A Field Survey in Eastern Slums of Kolkata,"
- 4 Sharon LaFraniere, "Another School Barrier for African Girls: No Toilet," *New York Times*, December 23, 2005, p. A1.
- 115 Pages

Study Questions

1. In designing the Swedish system of individual pension accounts, what assumptions did the designers make about the factors that would influence workers' decisions on how they would choose fund managers? What assumptions did they get right? What did they get wrong?
2. Who are the "targets" of policy in the Swedish PPM system? Did the targets change over time? Is it clear what "compliance" is in this case?
3. Why did active choice of pension funds decline so much in later rounds? Should it bother Swedish policymakers that so few new entrants to the PPM system make an active choice of fund managers? Why or why not?
4. What changes should be made in the PPM system, if any? You might want to consider altering incentives for program targets, improving monitoring of their compliance, and providing them with more information, among other options.

What are the political constraints on these reforms? Does the PPM experience suggest any specific lessons for other countries that are considering individual account pension systems?

5. Compare the role that client beliefs and behavior played in the success or failure of disease prevention initiatives discussed in today's readings. Are there common themes in the cases or distinct ones? Why were some disease prevention and eradication campaigns more successful than others?
6. How did the resistance to polio vaccination in northern Nigeria begin? What sorts of strategies have been most successful in reducing clientele resistance to disease reduction efforts or behavior inconsistent with those initiatives?
7. What general "takeaway" lessons emerge from the readings on the constraints that shape efforts to select and obtain compliance from program targets? What principles should guide program design and management? Are the constraints and lessons similar or different in LDCs and wealthy countries?
8. What was the villagization campaign in Tanzania? What were its objectives? Was it a failure? By what criteria?
9. Were the problems with the villagization program failure primarily problems of policy design, or failures of policy implementation (e.g., failure to provide adequate resources to front line workers, inappropriate incentives for front-line workers). What should have been done differently? Does a "good enough governance" perspective suggest anything useful about how to improve implementation of the villagization Program? What about the World Bank's "long route" and "short routes" to accountability?
10. Could anything have been done to improve target compliance in the villagization program—e.g., altering incentives for program "targets," improving monitoring of their compliance, providing them with more information, making them less mistrustful?
11. What does Scott mean by "local knowledge"? Why does he think that it is important in this case and in others? Do you agree with him? Would increased attention to local knowledge have made much of a difference in the Tanzania villagization case? Can you think of other situations (cases in this course or from your experience) where local knowledge on the part of program managers and front-line workers was critical to obtaining desirable outcomes, or where inadequate local knowledge contributed to undesirable outcomes?
12. What are the primary barriers to school attendance in Kolkata and in Balizenda, Ethiopia? Who are the "targets" of policy: students, parents or both? Are there other "targets" of policy as well whose compliance is needed to improve school attendance?
13. Given scarce resources, what sorts of policy changes would be most cost effective in encouraging increased school attendance in Balizenda and Ethiopia? You might want to consider such alternatives as improvements in infrastructure, cash transfers to parents conditional on adequate school attendance records, improving quality of front-line workers, and improving information to parents about the economic benefits of schooling. Are the same changes needed in both contexts?

PART II: CORE ISSUES IN PUBLIC MANAGEMENT

Session 5— Monday, March 29

Theme: Budget Priorities, Accountability and Fiscal Rules

Required Readings

- 35 B. Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, pp. 261-298.
- 15 Allen Schick, "The Changing Role of the Central Budget Office," *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, vol. 1, no. 1 (March 2001), pp. 1-18
- 25 Alasdair Roberts, "Lockbox Government: Segmented Funding Strategies and the Erosion of Governmental Flexibility" *Governance*, 2002, pp. 241-270
- 35 Barry Anderson and Joseph Minarik, "Design Choices for Fiscal Policy Rules," *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, vol 5, no. 4 (September 2006) pp. 160-195.

CASE MATERIAL:

- 10 "Seven Letters," Electronic Hallway teaching case
- 25 Christine Wong, "Budget Reform in China," *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, vol. 7, no. 1 (2007), pp. 33-56
120 pages

Optional Readings

- 30 Carlos Santiso, "Banking on Accountability? Strengthening Budget Oversight and Public Sector Auditing in Emerging Economies," *Public Budgeting and Finance*, Volume 26, Number 2 (July 2006), pp. 66-100.

Study Questions

1. What is budgetary incrementalism? Is it a description of current practice, a prescription of how budgeting should be done, or both? Under what conditions is it most and least likely to occur? What are its advantages and disadvantages as a prescription?
2. What are bulk budgeting and envelope budgeting? What are their advantages and disadvantages?
3. What does Schick mean by fiscal rules? Do they have any effects on budget outcomes? Under what conditions and in what forms are they likely to have greatest effect?
4. What are budgetary lockboxes? What forms do they take? Why have policymakers turned to them—is there a single cause or multiple causes? What are their advantages and disadvantages?
5. Schick says that a paradox of contemporary budgeting is that "central control of the items of expenditure may not give the centre effective control of the budget." ["Changing Role," p. 10] What does he mean? Is he right?

6. What is the conflict in the “Seven letters” case about? What gets it started? What are the stakes? Why does Budget Director Paula Harper feel such disappointment in Water Department Chief Engineer Mason's behavior? Is it justified? Were her requests for information reasonable or unreasonable? What is Chief Engineer Mason’s complaint about Paula Harper and the Budget Office. Is it justified?
7. If you were the budget director, how would you go about evaluating the Water Department's request for additional part-time and seasonal employees? Why would these steps be important in doing your job? What types of cost and related data do you think are necessary and appropriate here? Why do the parties have so much difficulty agreeing on what data is necessary? What does the Water Department have the right to expect from the Budget Office in this situation?
8. Is conflict between budgeteers and line agencies inevitable in disputes like those outlined in the “Seven letters” case? If so, does it harm the organization - i.e., city government? How can such conflict be managed effectively and productively?
9. How should the budget process operate in the “Seven Letters” case? What specific improvements should be made?
10. How is budgeting in LDCs likely to be different from in advanced industrial countries? What would a “good enough governance” financial management system for a country like Uganda include?

Session 6—Wednesday, March 31

Theme: Public Finance II: Alternative Sources of Government Finance and Inter-governmental Transfers

John Mikesell, *Fiscal Administration* [sixth edition], Belmont, CA: Wadsworth, 2003, selections

- 30 Louis A. Langlois and Robert P. Bescehl, Jr., *Public Expenditure Analysis and Management in the Republic of Kariba: A Case Study*, The Economic Development Institute of the World Bank, 1998.
- 25 Christine Wong, “Budget Reform in China,” *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, vol. 7, no. 1 (2007), pp. 33-56

Study Questions

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of various sources of government revenue (e.g., individual and corporate income taxes, consumption taxes, user fees) for financing government programs? Which are hardest to collect effectively? Are their differences between advanced industrial and less developed countries?
2. Should revenues raised at a particular level of government always be spent at that level of government, or is there a case for intergovernmental fiscal transfers? If so, under what conditions are transfers justified, and what sorts of conditions should be attached to those transfers?

Session 7—Monday, April 12

Theme: Policy Evaluation and Performance Measurement

Required Readings

- 20 Robert D. Behn, “Why Measure Performance? Different Purposes Require Different Measures”, *Public Administration Review*, vol. 63, no. 5 (2003) pp. 586-606.
- 25 Allen Schick, "The Performing State: Reflection on an Idea Whose Time Has Come but Whose Implementation Has Not," *OECD Journal on Budgeting*, vol 3, no. 2 (2003) pp. 71-103
- 20 Christopher Hood, “Gaming in Targetworld: The Targets Approach to Managing British Public Services,” *Public Administration Review*, vol. 66, no. 4 (2006), pp. 515–521.
- 15 James Arrowsmith, Keith Sisson and Paul Marginson, “What Can ‘Benchmarking’ Offer the Open Method of Coordination,” pp. 311-328 in *Journal of European Public Policy*, vol. 11, no. 2 (April 2004).

CASE MATERIAL :

- 20 Adikeshavalu Ravindra, *An Assessment of the Impact of Bangalore Citizen Report Cards on the Performance of Public Agencies*, World Bank Operations Evaluation Department, ECD Working Paper Series, No. 12, June 2004, pp. 1-20 [also available at [http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoctlib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/d241684df81fce2785256ead0062de10/\\$FILE/ecd_wp_12.pdf](http://lnweb18.worldbank.org/oed/oeddoctlib.nsf/24cc3bb1f94ae11c85256808006a0046/d241684df81fce2785256ead0062de10/$FILE/ecd_wp_12.pdf)]
- 20 “Trust and Mistrust: External Evaluators Assess Mexico’s Anti Poverty Programs,” Kennedy School case C16-04-1734.0
120 pages

Study Questions

1. What are performance measurement and benchmarking? Are they the same thing? What is Schick’s critique of performance measurement?
2. What is Allen Schick’s critique of New Public management reforms?
3. What is the Open Method of Coordination? How does it work? What are its advantages and limitations? Under what conditions is it most likely to lead to policy change? What changes could make the OMC more effective?
4. What sorts of problems were discovered in the evaluations of Mexican social policy programs. Are they likely to be similar in other countries and programs? Why or why not?
5. Were the evaluations that were done of SEDESOL programs used in the policymaking process? Why or why not?

6. What does the Mexican anti-poverty case suggest about the factors that affect how much impact research has? Compare to the case studies in the Trostle et al article. Are there any issues of politics, labor supply or methodology that are likely to be particularly important in less developed countries? What does the SEDESOL experience suggest about how to do more effective reforms in a developing country context? What can be done to improve the quality of policy advice, and its impact on policymaking, in LDCs? Under what conditions is policy research most and least likely to lead to a change in policy?

Session 8—Wednesday, April 14

Theme: Negotiation--Simulation of the Tata Motors Plant Negotiations in West Bengal

BACKGROUND MATERIAL

- Partha Pratim Basu, "'Brand Buddha' in India's West Bengal: The Left Reinvents Itself," *Asian Survey*, March/April 2007, Vol. 47, No. 2, Pages 288-306.
- Preeti Sampat, "Special Economic Zones in India," *Economic and Political Weekly*, July 12, 2008.

SINGUR AUTO PLANT CASE MATERIAL

- Somini Sengupta, "Razing Farms for Factory Creates Battleground in India," *New York Times*, December 29, 2006
- Dayabati Roy, "Politics at the Margin: A Tale of Two Villages," *Economic and Political Weekly*, August 11, 2007, pp. 3323-3329.
- Anand Giridharadas, "Indian Carmaker Says Local Politics Stopped Factory," *New York Times*, September 4, 2008
- Somini Sengupta, "India Grapples With How to Convert Its Farmland Into Factories," *New York Times*, September 17, 2008, p. A6
- Suhrid Sankar Chattopadhyay, "Starting trouble," and "'Land reform not an end in itself': Interview with Nirupam Sen, West Bengal Industries Minister," *Frontline*, vol. 23. no. 25 December 16-29, 2006.
- Walter Fernandes, "Singur and the Displacement Issue," *Economic and Political Weekly*, January 20, 2007, pp. 203-206.
- "Small Car, Big Troubles," *India Today*, February 26, 2007, pp. 21-22.
- "Singur cost rises by Rs 300cr- Kant points to changes in plan, vows Nano rollout from plant," *Calcutta Telegraph*, June 29, 2008

- “‘Worried’, Tata flashes Singur alert,” *Calcutta Telegraph*, August 22, 2008
- Biswajit Roy, “Plan for Singur market - Proposal to help unwilling farmers awaits perusal by Mamata,” *Calcutta Telegraph*, August 26, 2008
- Ashok Mitra, “A Way Out for Singur: Farmers can still be given a stake in the ownership of the plant,” *Calcutta Telegraph*, August 29, 2008

VIDEO MATERIALS:

- Documentary video *Abad Bhumi (The Right to Land)* at <http://video.google.com/videoplay?docid=3052261023426138538&q=singur&hl=en>

Study Questions:

1. What are the advantages and disadvantages of Special Economic Zones (SEZs) for host governments? Why did the national government of India and the West Bengal government back them?
2. What should the CPI(M) government do to respond to the protests in Singur? Is it realistic to think that a compromise can be reached with the Trinamool Congress and their allies?

Session 9— Monday, May 10

Theme: Accountability and the Problem of Corruption

Required Readings

- 120 J. Edgardo Campos and Sanjay Pradhan, *The Many Faces of Corruption: Tracking Vulnerabilities at the Sector Level*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2007, Introduction, chapters 4, 9, 11, Conclusion
- 10 “Corruption in La Paz: A Mayor Fights City Hall,” , Kennedy School Case C16-99-1523.0.
130 pages

Study Questions

1. What forms does corruption take? Is it the same everywhere? Why or why not? Are different strategies likely to be more or less effective against different types of corruption?
2. What causes corruption?
3. How much difference can a determined leader make in reducing corruption? What are the constraints and limitations on anti-corruption initiatives? What strategies are likely to be most effective?

PART III: PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM

Session 10— Wednesday, April 21st

Theme: The Public Sector: Reform, Reinvent, Decentralize?

Required Readings

- 20 Merilee S. Grindle, “The Good, the Bad and the Unavoidable: Improving the Public Service in Poor Countries,” pp. 90-110 in John D. Donahue and Joseph S. Nye, Jr., eds. *For the People: Can We Fix Public Service?*, Washington, D.C.: The Brookings Institution, 2003.
- 10 Allen Schick, “Why Most Developing Countries Should Not Try New Zealand Reforms,” *World Bank Research Observer*, vol. 13, no. 1 (February 1998), pp. 123–31
- 5 Ian Lienert, “Civil Service Reform in Africa: Mixed Results 10 Years After” *Finance and Development*, 1998, pp.42-45.
- 15 World Bank, *Making Services Work for Poor People*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003, pp. 47-61 (The remainder of the chapter is optional).
- 20 Pranab Bardhan, “Decentralization of Governance and Development,” *The Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Vol. 16, No. 4. (Autumn, 2002), pp. 185-205.
- 35 World Bank, *Making Services Work for Poor People*, Washington, D.C.: World Bank, 2003, pp. 180-217
- 10 Paul Smoke, “Decentralisation in Africa: Goals, Dimensions, Myths and Challenges,” *Public Administration and Development*, vol 23 (2003) pp. 7-16.

CASE MATERIAL:

- 10 Richard Robinson and David Stiedl, “Decentralisation of Road Administration: Case Studies in Africa and Asia,” *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 21 (2001) pp. 53-64.
135 pages

Optional Readings

- 40 Guy Peters, *The Politics of Bureaucracy*, pp. 85-134.

Study Questions

1. What goals should an “effective” civil service system strive to achieve? What should it seek to avoid? Are there any trade-offs between these goals?
2. Why do many civil services and individual public servants perform poorly? What conditions or rules are likely to make them perform better?

3. Grindle argues that “public sector reformers in developing countries need to consider changes that directly address performance incentives and management practices” but that “good public sector performance ultimately depends on the development of political societies that expect and demand efficiency, effectiveness and responsiveness from their governments.” [p. 92] What does this mean? How can these societal expectations be promoted, or can they?
4. Are the problems of the African public service noted by Lienert similar to those noted by Grindle, or are they distinctive? Why?
5. What should less developed countries strive for in their personnel systems? Do the experiences outlined in the readings for today suggest any civil service “best practices” that can and should be applied to other countries? If so, what are they? Are there limitations on their generalizability?
6. What are the advantages and disadvantages of decentralization as a strategy for improving the quality of governance?
7. What are the distinctive problems that governments in less developed countries confront in terms of decentralization? Are there ways around these problems?

Session 11—Monday, May 12th

Topic: Privatization, Partnerships and User Charges

Required Readings

- 30 John Nellis and Nancy Birdsall, eds., *Reality Check: The Distributional Impact of Privatization in Developing Countries*, Washington, D.C.: The Center for Global Development, 2005, pp. 1-30
- 10 Nicholas Aworti, “Getting the Fundamentals Wrong: Woes of Public-Private Partnerships in Solid Waste Collection in Three Ghanaian Cities,” *Public Administration and Development*, vol. 24 (2004) pp. 213-224.
- 20 “Cancun, Mexico: Water System Privatization,” and sequel, Kennedy School Case Program 1593.0.

Study Questions

1. Are the problems of water supply in Cancun similar to or different from those of garbage collection in Ghana? Are there common roots to performance inadequacies in the two cases?
2. What does the experience with Aguakan in Cancun suggest about the potential advantages and pitfalls of privatization in a developing country context? Should anything have been done differently? If so, what? What should be done now?
3. How are public-private partnerships distinctive? What are their advantages and disadvantages? What lessons does the Ghana garbage collection case suggest about how these arrangements should be structured?
4. What was done wrong in Ghana? What should have been done differently?

5. What are the lessons that we should carry away from public sector reform experiments in less developed countries? Is it simply that we should pay attention to context? Are there specific steps that can be taken during the privatization process that may help to secure better outcomes?

Session 12—Student Presentations

Students will Meet in three groups on

Wednesday, May 14th

Monday, May 17th

Wednesday, May 19th